Nemesis

COX: ARAMCO IS AN ESG INVESTOR’S WORST NIGHTMARE

BY ROB COX

The most important document for global investors considering whether to purchase Saudi Aramco’s stock is not actually the Saudi Arabian energy giant’s prospectus. Sure, the fundamentals of the business will determine whether the state-controlled company is worth anything like the $2 trillion that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has insisted it should be.

But for a broader understanding of what it means to back the stock offering, which will kick off in coming weeks on Riyadh’s Tadawul exchange, the last country report on the kingdom from Human Rights Watch should be required reading for all fund managers.

As the independent watchdog makes clear, the murder and bone-sawing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year by Saudi agents in Istanbul is not an isolated violation of the basic norms accepted by the world’s liberal democracies. From arbitrary arrests of peaceful dissidents and widespread discrimination of women to hundreds of beheadings, and the prosecution of a war in neighboring Yemen that according to Human Rights Watch “included scores of unlawful airstrikes that have killed and wounded thousands of civilians,” Saudi’s record is abysmal.

And this is just the “social” bit that investors weighing the deal’s so-called “ESG” profile (the other letters in the acronym denote environmental and governance factors) must consider. For starters, Aramco’s business model is almost entirely predicated on humans continuing to spew carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. And even after the IPO, its 95%-plus government stake will make the governance that helped collapse WeWork’s IPO look benign. Fund managers with any conscience should steer clear of Aramco. And if they don’t, their customers should consider boycotting them.

True, Aramco isn’t directly responsible for the transgressions of its ultimate owner. The oil group chaired by Yasir al-Rumayyan did not lop off the heads of 139 subjects, including 54 for non-violent drug crimes, according to Interior Ministry statements cited by Human Rights Watch. Nor did Aramco direct airstrikes against Houthi rebels, even though Ibrahim Al-Assaf, who was foreign minister for part of the time that military campaign unfolded, sits on Aramco’s board.

But Aramco is undeniably the financial engine that powers the domain over which the 34-year-old MbS domineers, including its military and defence budgets and its programmes of social repression. The petroleum sector, of which Aramco is the beating heart, kidney and lungs, accounts for 87% of the government’s budget revenues, according to the Central Intelligence Agency, and 90% of its export earnings.

None of this may matter to the domestic Saudi institutions and retail investors who will be asked, if not forcibly prodded, to soak up a slice of 2%-3% of Aramco hitting the Riyadh market. It is unlikely, either, to deter potential cornerstone investors from China, such as the Silk Road Fund, Sinopec or China Investment Corporation, which have been in talks to buy as much as $10 billion worth of Aramco stock, according to Bloomberg.

But it should matter in the United States, where more than a quarter of all the $47 trillion of assets under professional management in 2018 were invested in sustainable, responsible and impact investing, according to the US SIF Foundation’s 2018 biennial report. That number was up 38% over the two-year period. The trend in Europe is similarly robust, with 2,232 ESG-related funds pulling in 37 billion euros of new money in the first half of 2019, almost equal to the 38 billion euros they received for all of 2018, according to Morningstar.

There are some caveats. The Aramco sale is part of a rational, long-term vision by MbS to reduce his nation’s reliance on fossil fuels. And Aramco argues that it wants to be part of the solution to global warming. “At Saudi Aramco, sustainability is an ethos that permeates all aspects of our company,” the company’s website reads. “It spurs us to push the limits of creativity and technology to develop and implement meaningful solutions to global energy and climate challenges – all while being a steadfast contributor to the world’s energy security.”

Ultimately, though, Aramco’s 227 billion barrels of proved liquid reserves represent one of the single greatest threats to mankind’s attempts to reduce carbon emissions and avoid an ecological apocalypse. Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, BP and Total pose similar challenges to efforts to reduce the warming of the planet, of course. But Aramco’s reserves are five times larger than the combined proved liquid reserves of the five majors.

As if the social and environmental hazards of Aramco’s existence weren’t reason enough to eschew the stock, there’s governance. Though Aramco has been run in a professional manner in ways that many other national oil companies, such as those in Venezuela or Mexico, have not been, the Saudi monarchy’s interests will ultimately take precedence over all others. As the veteran emerging-market investor Mark Mobius put it to Reuters earlier this year: “If something happens where Saudi Arabia is in trouble for one reason or another and they need the money, (Aramco) will need to transfer assets to the government.”

Add it all up, and on nearly every measure that could possibly be considered under the umbrella of ESG, Saudi Aramco ticks all the wrong boxes. That’s before considering other risks, like the near-certainty that underwriters will bend over backwards to satisfy the crown prince’s subjective views on Aramco’s worth, or the potential for further disruption to its operations from drone strikes like the ones that hampered production in September. Foreign institutions that still invest will have zero basis to say any of this was unclear.

First published Nov. 7, 2019

(Image: REUTERS/Hamad I Mohammed)

ARAMCO HAS FIRST-CLASS SEAT ON OIL-TANKER TITANIC

BY GEORGE HAY

Saudi Aramco’s relative strength as the world’s biggest oil producer is an absolute distraction when it comes to establishing its worth. The Saudi oil giant’s initial public offering prospectus, published on Saturday, outlines how it is both much more profitable than sector peers like Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell, and more likely than them to remain afloat when the global oil industry hits the iceberg of peak demand. The problem is that such a collision is coming, and matters greatly to the company’s valuation.

The 658-page doorstop that Aramco presented to would-be investors lacks some short-term details like the size and price of its impending stock-market listing, but gives some eyecatching detail on the longer term. It assumes a 0.8% compound annual growth rate for global crude oil demand between 2018 and 2030, compared to the 0.5% for 2017 to 2030 cited in Aramco’s first international bond prospectus in April. But its two newly revealed post-2030 demand scenarios, using independent projections from consultant IHS Markit, are rather less bullish. One has global demand levelling off in 2035, while another sees it peak in the mid-2020s.

Aramco’s contention is that it can weather those scenarios. It says it can muster a 10% rate of return with oil prices well below $20 a barrel, compared with more than $60 today. That explains its 41% return on average capital employed in 2018, compared to 8% for its peers on average. On the basis that the most expensive oil production would be mothballed first, Aramco’s absolute production would still increase even if oil demand fell sharply by 2050, and its market share would jump to 20% from around 12% now.

The catch is oil prices. If demand really did start to tail off in the next decade, those might well fall. Politicians are not yet doing what’s needed to keep global warming below acceptable levels, but they may yet step up their efforts, faced with increasingly tangible signs of climate change. Even as the best placed of the oil producers, Aramco’s $75 billion annual dividend might then be harder to guarantee. Potential participants in its IPO should ponder not just how long they would want to stay on board, but whether they want to get on at all.

First published Nov. 11, 2019

ARAMCO’S $1.7 TRLN PRICE TAG PLEASES ALMOST NO ONE

BY GEORGE HAY

Saudi Aramco has gone for a suboptimal compromise. The long-awaited price range for its massive initial public offering, unveiled on Sunday, confirmed what everyone already knew: The Saudi Arabian oil giant is not worth the $2 trillion the kingdom originally sought. But even at a valuation of $1.6 trillion to $1.7 trillion it may still be too pricey for foreign investors.

Valuing Aramco shares at between 30 riyals and 32 riyals ($8-$8.5) is a step forward. The narrow range implies a high level of confidence in demand for the offering, which will give Saudi’s Public Investment Fund around $25 billion to help diversify the kingdom’s economy away from oil. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s willingness to accept a valuation below his preferred target shows an unusual capacity for compromise.

Even so, no one is getting what they want. The crown prince’s reputation for bending markets to his will suffers a dent. International institutions, meanwhile, would have preferred a valuation between $1.2 trillion and $1.3 trillion. At that level Aramco shares would yield about 6%, based on the company’s promise to pay annual dividends worth at least $75 billion for the next five years. That is in line with the average yield offered by other listed oil giants. The expectation that most foreign investors will pass helps explain why Saudi is offering only 1.5% of the shares, rather than 2% or even 3%.

Despite prioritising valuation over foreign appeal, Riyadh should still raise as much or slightly more than Alibaba’s record $25 billion offering in 2014 – a massive sum given its tiny domestic stock market. Some non-Saudi investors could still take part, and overseas funds which track emerging market indexes will be compelled to buy after Aramco starts trading. If oil prices stay elevated, retail investors who snap up 0.5% of the company, with the help of loans from local banks, will have been motivated by more than national pride.

Still, the IPO was also supposed to open Saudi capital markets, revive meagre foreign direct investment and help power diversification. A lower price tag might have enabled a bigger offering, and attracted greater interest from blue-chip global institutions to offset concerns about peak oil demand – not to mention Saudi’s woeful human rights record. Aramco’s compromise means those goals could remain unfulfilled.

First published Nov. 17, 2019

(Image: REUTERS/Hamad I Mohammed)

ARAMCO IPO HAS DUG SAUDI AN EVEN DEEPER HOLE

BY GEORGE HAY

Saudi Aramco finally pulled off its $25.6 billion initial public offering. Party time in Riyadh? Probably not, because the world’s biggest stock market listing has in one way accomplished the opposite of its intended goal.

The oil giant priced at the top of its range at a $1.7 trillion valuation, giving Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman a bit extra to divert to Public Investment Fund, through which the kingdom hopes to diversify away from an economic dependence on oil. That recovers a little of the pride lost in abandoning plans to list at a $2 trillion valuation, and in selling only 1.5% on the local bourse rather than a previously mooted 5%.

A high price might have been an undiluted good had Saudi been able to sell a big chunk of Aramco to foreign investors. But only a portion of the offer ended up being sold to non-Saudis, with some of them likely to have been wealth funds from nearby Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. Although Aramco didn’t disclose the split when it announced its price on Thursday, non-Saudis made up 10% of the institutional demand a week earlier – and slightly more than that in the final analysis, according to a person familiar with the situation.

There were plenty of reasons for them to hang back, from Saudi’s poor human rights record to the fact that Aramco is unlikely to be worth more than $1.6 trillion, as Breakingviews has argued on numerous occasions.

That leaves the crown prince in a less-than-ideal position. For example, it suggests Saudi can’t count on an ecstatic reaction should it decide to part-privatize other industrial assets in future. More importantly, it turns Aramco stock into a political hot potato. It’s one thing if institutional investors get hosed by a falling Aramco share price, but another thing if retail punters who bought one-third of the stock – many funded by loans from local banks – suffer a similar fate.

With citizens’ wealth tied up in an investment whose valuation fluctuates publicly minute to minute, Saudi might find itself even more focused on ensuring maximum oil production, rather than improving the health of the general market. In that case, Aramco’s IPO won’t be a step away from fossil fuel dependency, but a step closer towards it.

First published Dec. 5, 2019